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7.1 INTRODUCTION
Technological change directed towards more efﬁcient and eco-friendly
technologies is a priority for both developed and developing countries.
Insights on past trends and determinants of energy innovation, including
political economy factors and non-ﬁnancial drivers, are important to set the
basis for cost-effective climate and energy policies in the coming years. Issues
such as the role of institutions and lobbying as enabling or inhibiting factors
are critical factors that have been only marginally examined by the existing
literature.
This chapter uses two commonly used indicators of innovation, energy
industrial R&D and energy patents for 20 countries for the years 1995–2010
to examine the inﬂuence of political economy factors on energy-related innov-
ations using econometric analysis. Political economy factors can be broadly
deﬁned as those concerning the interactions and tensions between de jure and
de facto power, including the distribution of resources, the rules for the exercise
of power and the enforcement of contracts, the procedures and institutions for
settling conﬂicts over these rules, or the physical and organizational infrastruc-
ture supporting economic activities, transactions, and collective actions.1 We
focus on four aspects: the types and stringency of government support to
energy innovation (e.g., the various policy instruments implemented to this
end such as environmental and R&D policies); the quality of governance
(e.g., government effectiveness); the political orientation of the government;
and the distribution of resources across interest groups.
1 Stavins (2004) refers to political economy as the process through which political decisions
are made.
The role of these factors in relation to energy innovation dynamics, energy
transition, and sustainable development has been acknowledged by several
contributions both in the policy and in the economics realms (Anadón 2012;
Friedrichs and Inderwildi 2013; Hughes and Lipscy 2013; IPCC 2014; IEA
2015a). More than other sectors, energy can be dominated by large incumbent
companies and utilities, which often seek to inﬂuence policy. Their invest-
ments, especially in new technologies are shaped by the incentives and regu-
lations set by policy makers (Lockwood 2013a). Moreover, the actual impact of
regulations and government policies is affected by the broader institutional
settings (Stavins 2004). Good governance is particularly important as many of
the government interventions are economic policies (Lockwood 2013a) and
bureaucrats are the actors ultimately implementing these policies (Lockwood
2013b).
The role of governance quality, political orientation of the government, and
distribution of resources across interest groups have received only marginal
attention and have not been explored jointly in the empirical literature on
energy innovation. In this speciﬁc domain, the role of public policies as drivers
of innovation has received more attention than institutions and political
economy factors. The multiple sources of market failures that characterize
the energy sector and the recent debate regarding the actions governments
should undertake to curb rising greenhouse gas emissions partly explains the
focus of the current literature on the role of environmental, energy, and
innovation policies. In the energy-environmental realm, state intervention is
motivated by the presence of environmental externalities (a gap between
private and social returns to pollution control), as well as of innovation
externalities (a gap between private and social returns to innovation). More-
over, in comparison to other sectors, energy R&D often entails large-scale
projects, which need public support (Anadón 2012).
This chapter contributes to the debate by jointly assessing the inﬂuence of
environmental and R&D policies, governance quality, political orientation,
and distribution of resources to energy intensive industries on energy innov-
ation. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 discusses our
measures of energy innovation. Section 7.3 provides the empirical framework
and describes the main hypotheses explored in the empirical analysis.
Section 7.4 discusses the results. Section 7.5 concludes, highlighting policy
implications and future research needs.
7 .2 MEASURING ENERGY INNOVATION TRENDS
Studying innovation systems and dynamics using an empirical approach is
challenging, as innovation comprises both tangible and intangible outputs
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(e.g., new technologies, machines, products, patents but also ideas, process
innovation, managerial, and organizational innovation). Following a large
empirical innovation economics literature, we study the more tangible and
measurable aspects of the innovation process. While these constitute only a
part of the innovation output relevant for the energy system and sector, they
nonetheless provide important insights that can complement those from
qualitative and bottom-up case studies focusing on more intangible and less
measureable aspects such as organizational innovation.
Here we focus on R&D expenditures and patent counts.2 The former
informs on the inputs of the innovation process, while the latter is a proxy of
innovation outputs. Both indicators suffer from some speciﬁc shortcomings.
R&D investments provide insights on innovation effort but not on innovation
quality. Conversely, patent statistics provide a partial measure as not all
innovations are patented, even though they can be weighted using information
on several indicators to control for quality (for instance, claims or citations, see
Griliches 1990). Furthermore, patents may increase due to changes in patent
law or strategic reasons to signal in which companies to invest in, regardless of
innovative activity (Mazzucato 2013).
In the case of energy innovation, matters are further complicated by the fact
that it is unclear how clean innovation or even energy innovation are deﬁned
(Gallagher et al. 2011). A number of studies focus speciﬁcally on the energy
supply sector (Salies 2010; Sterlacchini, 2012; Costa-Campi et al. 2014) but
energy-saving R&D and innovation are pervasive. Energy is an input for
nearly all sectors of the economy and the way in which energy is produced,
transformed, and distributed depends on innovative activities well beyond
those of the energy supply sector itself. All R&D expenditures are inputs into
complex processes that ultimately lead to innovations that may or may not be
clean. In order to proxy for industrial R&D investments in energy, we rely on
the Analytical Business Enterprise Research and Development (ANBERD)
database (OECD 2016), which provides information on the R&D expenditures
at the sectoral level for 30 countries for the years 1990–2013.3 We deﬁne
energy R&D investments in two ways. First, we focus on R&D spending in the
‘Electricity, water and gas distribution industry’, which represents the down-
stream sector for energy production (power R&D). Second, we deﬁne energy
investments as a combination of R&D expenditures from ‘Electricity, water
and gas distribution industry’ and ‘Mining’, which capture the combined R&D
effort in the upstream and downstream energy supply sector (energy R&D).
2 Arguably, R&D investments and patents represent only part of the full innovation process,
as they somewhat disregard the issue of technology diffusion. Speciﬁcally, patent data is an
imperfect indicator of technology diffusion, but nonetheless widely used in the literature to
proxy for the other, earlier stages of innovation (see, for instance, Hall and Rosenberg 2010).
3 Our analysis focuses on the 20 countries between 1995 and 2010 for which both policy and
institutional data are available.
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These measures arguably represent a lower-bound estimate of energy-
related innovation (Upstill and Hall 2006), as they only include the R&D
directly performed by the energy supply sectors. Indeed, non-energy sectors
indirectly contribute to energy-related innovation. For instance, improve-
ments in the manufacturing of chemicals and chemical products, and in
computer and electronics, contribute to the development of energy system
technologies, such as solar power or smart grids. These are ‘embedded’ in the
capital that is supplied to the energy supply sector. The sum of the direct and
‘embedded’ R&D can be considered an estimate of the upper bound of
industrial energy-related R&D in a given country. Input–output data can be
used to provide an estimate of energy-related R&D expenditures including
the research performed in other economic sectors that are embedded in the
capital purchased by the electricity and the mining sectors. Dasgupta, De
Cian, and Verdolini (2016) provide a detailed description and application of
this method.
While providing insights on the extent of energy innovation efforts, the
ANBERD statistics have some shortcomings. For instance, they report
R&D expenditure by sector of performance expenditure, regardless of
whether funds were provided by the private or by the public sector. This
means that industrial R&D reported by ANBERD statistics might include
a fraction of R&D expenditure funded by the government and therefore
reported in the government budget outlays as well. For this reason, we
refer to the R&D reported in the ANBERD statistics as industrial rather
than private R&D.
Another widely used proxy for innovation is patent counts, which is an
indicator of the output of the industrial R&D process (Griliches 1990).4 The
temporal and country coverage of patent data is often broader than that of
R&D statistics and makes it an attractive empirical proxy. In the speciﬁc case
of energy-related innovation, a further advantage of using patent data is the
possibility of assigning patents to speciﬁc energy technology classes in
the energy sector, which also include renewables (Johnstone, Ivan Haščič,
and Popp 2010) and efﬁcient fossil-based technologies for electricity gener-
ation (Lanzi, Verdolini, and Haščič 2011). We collect patent statistics from
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Patent Statistics Database (OECD 2015b) and count applications through
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) by the inventor country and priority
date. The technologies included in our patent counts are the following:5
4 Indeed patents are positively correlated with power R&D (correlation coefﬁcient for power
patents is 0.41 and 0.62 for environmental patents) and with energy R&D (power patents 0.50
and environmental patents 0.44).
5 Please refer to Haščič and Migotto (2015) and OECD (2015a) for more details about the
technologies included.
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(1) Power Patents: related to energy generation, they include both energy
generations from renewable and non-fossil sources and technologies
improving the efﬁciency of fossil fuels, such as Integrated Gasiﬁcation
Combined Cycle and improved burners. Both renewable and fossil-
efﬁcient technologies have signiﬁcant mitigation potential (IEA 2014).
(2) Green Patents: include power patents as well as the patents in the
technology domains of general environmental management, technolo-
gies speciﬁc to climate change mitigation, energy efﬁciency in buildings
and lighting, technologies with potential or indirect contribution to
emissions mitigation, emissions abatement, and fuel efﬁciency in
transportation.
7 .3 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Combining the data sources on our variables of interest described in
Section 7.2, we build an unbalanced panel of 20 countries for the years
1995–2010. Please refer to Dasgupta, De Cian, and Verdolini (2016) for a
detailed description of the data and descriptive statistics. The literature has
used alternative methods to examine the role of political economy in the
context of energy technology choices and in the context of innovation, such
socio-technical transition studies (see Johnstone and Stirling (2015) for an
example of such approach and Turnheim et al. (2015) for a review of the
approach). Socio-technical transition studies can analyse multiple dimensions
of change, including economic, political, and socio-cultural aspects at different
levels and temporalities. Econometric analysis, speciﬁcally panel regression
analysis, can complement this approach and isolate the inﬂuence of environ-
mental policy, institutional quality, political orientation, and resource distribu-
tion conditional on each of the other factors, controlling for country-invariant
and time-invariant characteristics.
7.3.1 Empirical Model
We use our data to estimate the following general reduced form equation:
yit ¼ αi þ γt þ πitβ1 þ x2φit þ β3ρit þ β4θit þ Zitωþ εit; ð1Þ
where the subscripts i and t indicate respectively the country and the year, and:
• yit is a variable measuring the energy innovation intensity of the econ-
omy. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne yit as the share of one of our innovation
proxies discussed in Section 7.2 (i.e., industrial energy R&D, power
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R&D, power patents, or environmental patents) over total value added.
We scale all innovation proxies relative to the total value added to
account for the heterogeneity in the countries included in our sample.
This is in line with the general literature on this topic (see, for instance,
Popp 2002).
• πit is a vector of policy stringency measures, discussed in detail in
Section 7.3.2 and includes both market-based and non-market-based
instruments directly targeting the environmental externality, such as
taxes or standards, as well as government R&D investments in energy
innovation targeting the knowledge externality.
• φit is a proxy for institutional quality, measured either by government
effectiveness or by an aggregate indicator of governance quality discussed
in Section 7.4.
• ρit is a proxy of the political orientation of the government.
• θit is a proxy of the distribution of resources to the energy sector relative
to the rest of the economy, which in our framework inform on two
different aspects, market-size effect and the power of the energy lobby
within each country.
• Zit is a vector of other relevant control variables inﬂuencing innovation
investments, including an index for industrial energy prices and trade
openness. Higher energy prices are expected to increase innovation
incentives, net of any political economy consideration (Popp 2002),
whereas trade openness can have an ambiguous effect.
• αi and γt are country and year ﬁxed effects, while εit is a random error
term. Country ﬁxed effects control for time-invariant factors, including
persistent institutional factors, such as the democratic/autocratic charac-
teristics and system of government of countries. The time ﬁxed effects
control for inter-temporal trends that are uniform across countries, such
as the economic cycle.
The expectations about the roles of the variables of interest, πit, ρit , θit , is
detailed in the research hypotheses presented in Section 7.3.2. The regressions
are estimated using ﬁxed effect linear models, as both our R&D and patent
data are continuous variables.6 Due to the different nature of R&D invest-
ments and patents, we use a different lag structure in our models. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that R&D investments react faster to environmental policies
than patents. This is due to the fact that patents measure the output of
the innovation process. Applying for patent requires ﬁrst to put the R&D
investment to work and then develop and test new ideas. Thus, the
6 The patents from the OECD database are computed using fractional counting and hence are
continuous in nature.
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R&D speciﬁcations use a one-year time lag, while the patent equation uses a
two-year time lag.7
7.3.2 Research Hypotheses
We use the model presented in Section 7.3.1 to test a set of hypotheses inspired
by the existing literature. The four hypotheses of interest are discussed in
this section.
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Environmental policy stringency ðπitÞ results in
dynamic efﬁciency gains. Stringent regulations provide long-term incentives
for innovation in energy-saving and pollution-reducing technologies.
Overcoming environmental issues requires addressing two market failures.
Since pollution is not priced appropriately, private ﬁrms tend to over-pollute
with respect to the social optimum. The environmental externality can be
directly targeted by using two different policy instruments: market-based
policies, such as a tax on pollution, feed-in tariffs, or trading schemes, and
non-market-based policies, such as standards or incentives for R&D invest-
ments in cleaner energy. Both instruments have been widely used in the
countries in our sample.
The available literature provides evidence on both market-based and non-
market-based instruments, together with innovation policies, supporting
cleaner technologies, and affecting the rate and direction of technological
change (Jaffe, Peterson, and Portney 1995; Popp 2002; Johnstone, Ivan Haščič,
and Popp 2010) but a priori their effectiveness may be different (Fischer,
Parry, and Pizer 2003; Newell 2010). Previous empirical studies on the
inducement effect of environmental and energy policy on innovation have
employed different measures of environmental stringency, policy instruments,
and innovation indicators (Brunel and Levinson 2013). Here we rely on the
recent environmental policy stringency (EPS) database of the OECD (Botta
and Koźluk 2014), which provides detailed cross-country information on
several instruments and on the International Energy Agency (IEA) Energy
7 Note that, incidentally, allowing for a one (two)-year lag structure in the R&D (patent)
equation also partly addresses concerns regarding the endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
Regarding country-level variables such as good governance, the political orientation of the
government and the lobbying power of the energy sector, endogeneity corners are weak to
non-existent, since environmental innovation represents only a fraction of the innovative
capacity of the countries in our sample during the time period explored. Hence, it is unlikely
to be a major driver of country-level variables. Conversely, there may be concerns regarding the
endogeneity of the EPS policy indicators, as the availability of cleaner and more efﬁcient energy
technologies may be inﬂuencing the ability of countries to propose, pass, and adopt environ-
mental policies (Carrion-Flores and Innes 2010). Allowing for a time lag reduces concerns in
this respect.
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Technologies R&D database (IEA 2015b). The EPS aggregate policy indicator
(EPS-Total score) is constructed using information on both market-based and
non-market policies.8 For each policy instrument, countries are scored on a
scale from 0 to 6 depending on the stringency of the policy they implement.
Such scores are then weighted and aggregated to construct the aggregate
policy indicator.9
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Institutional quality, measured as good governance,
increases the incentives to invest in energy-related innovation.
The role of governance quality has been widely examined in the context of
investments by the literature on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) drivers and
to a lesser extent, by the general literature on innovation.10 The dominant view
is that good governance aids FDI (Ayal and Karras 1996; Globerman and
Shapiro 2003; Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006; Gani 2007; Staats and Biglaiser
2012).11 However, poor governance can also lead to more foreign investments
if combined with high levels of corruption (Bellos and Subasat 2012). The
literature on general innovation states that better institutions are likely to
promote general innovation and investments (Habiyaremye and Raymond
2013; Tebaldi and Elmslie 2013; Silve and Plekhanov 2015). We test whether
government effectiveness and more broadly good governance as measured by
the World Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
2010)12 affect energy-related innovation. WGI institutional quality indicators
are measured on a normalized scale from (−)2.5 to (+)2.5, where the highest
value indicates better governance. We focus on government effectiveness,
which is an indicator of bureaucratic quality and speed. Low levels of govern-
ment effectiveness can be associated with excessive regulations, lengthy pro-
cesses, and lower transparency in the form of ﬂow of information.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The political orientation of the government inﬂuences
investments in energy R&D and patents. On the one hand, left-leaning
8 Market-based policies include feed-in tariffs (FITs—solar and wind), taxes (on CO2, SOx,
NOx, and diesel), certiﬁcates (White, Green, and CO2), and the presence of deposit and refund
schemes (DRS). Non-market-based policies include standards, such as emission limits for SOx,
NOx, and SO2 and on the sulphur content of diesel, as well as public R&D investment in energy
technologies.
9 We refer the interested reader to Botta and Koźluk (2014) for details about the indicators’
construction.
10 The general literature on the determinants of innovation in the manufacturing sector is
broad (Becheikh et al. 2006; Hall and Rosenberg 2010) and focuses on several key internal
factors, such as size, ﬁrm age, skills, and qualiﬁed personnel.
11 Good governance is deﬁned as a government that entails an independent judiciary and
legislation, fair and transparent laws with impartial enforcement, reliable public ﬁnancial
information, and high public trust (Subasat and Bellos 2011).
12 For more detailed information on the WGI, please see <http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home> (accessed 12 October 2016).
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governments are more likely to implement regulations that attract innovation
and investment in energy-related R&D. On the other hand, right-wing-oriented
governments are more likely to take a laissez faire approach. Therefore, the
impact of political orientation can be ambiguous.
The role of government political orientation has been examined in the context
of environmental policy adoption (Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2014;
Folke 2014) and to some extent, in the context of private investment and
FDI. In the former, the consensus seems to be that right-wing governments
generally oppose laws to support climate regulations (McCright and Dunlap
2011; Painter and Ashe 2012), while left-wing governments are more likely to
pass them (Neumayer 2003 and Fankhauser, Gennaioli, and Collins 2014). On
the contrary, right-leaning governments are more inclined to allow the market
forces to stimulate investment efforts (Esping-Andersen 1990; Boix 1998). The
FDI literature, however, provides somewhat contrasting insights. Shleifer
(1998) states that right-wing governments consider the private sector to be
more conducive in terms of innovation and therefore tend not to intervene in
the market while Hawkins, Mintz, and Provissiero (1976) and Jensen (2006)
mention that left-leaning governments are more likely to expropriate foreign
assets, which discourages FDI. We use political orientation of governments
from the Database of Political Institutions 2012 (DPI) (Beck et al. 2001) as
proxies for political institutions, speciﬁcally, the political orientation of the
executive party with respect to economic policy. This is a categorical variable
that takes three values: right (1), centre (2), and left (3) orientations.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A higher share of energy intensive sectors will (a) give
rise to a market-size effect (i.e., higher demand for energy), (b) lead to more
lobbying power of the energy intensive sectors towards the government, and
(c) increase the coordination costs of such lobbying activities. Therefore,
the impact of resource distribution on energy-related innovation is not clear
a priori.
The distribution of resources across interest groups may give rise to several
dynamics. First, if an economy relies more on energy intensive sectors, the
market for new energy inventions will be larger. As a result, the value
associated with any innovation relative to energy goods will be higher, as it
is more proﬁtable to develop technologies that have a larger market (see, for
instance, the discussion of market-size effects in the directed technical change
literature in Acemoglu (2002)). This would suggest that larger energy-
intensive sectors will likely result in more energy-related innovation. Second,
energy intensive incumbent industries with access to signiﬁcant resources tend
to engage in lobbying for government support and seek to inﬂuence policy
decisions. For instance, Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) argue that strong
industry lobbies may engage in corruption to reduce environmental policy
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stringency while Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf (2004) remark that
incumbent industries utilize their lobbying power to oppose structural trans-
formation. Third, larger sectors may imply more ﬁrms/actors, and this would
result in higher coordination costs of such lobbying activities (Olson 1965;
Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf 2004).
In line with previous literature (Fredriksson, Vollebergh, and Dijkgraaf
2004; Costa-Campi et al. 2014), we use the value-added share of energy-
intensive industries (Coke, Reﬁned Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel, Chemicals
and Chemical Products, Rubber and Plastics, Water and Air Transport,
Electricity, Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Mining)13 in the economy
computed using industrial value added data from the WIOD database
(Timmer et al. 2015) as an indicator of market-size, lobbying power, and
coordination costs.
Table 7.1 summarizes the main proxy variables that are used to measure the
key drivers behind the four hypotheses described in this section.
7 .4 RESULTS
The empirical results of our analysis using the two main indicators of innov-
ation described in Section 7.2 are provided in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. Table 7.2
Table 7.1. Political economy factors: hypothesis and proxy variables
Hypothesis Proxy Variables
H1: Environmental policy
EPS-Market,
EPS-Non-market,
EPS-Total
H2: Governance
Governance effectiveness,
Governance Average WGI indicator,
Governance x EPS-Total
H3: Left-wing political orientation Political orientation
H4: Lobbying
Value added share of energy-intensive industries
Value added share of carbon-intensive industries
Value added share of electricity
Source: Authors’ conceptualization.
13 Energy-intensive sectors have been deﬁned as the sectors with energy intensity above the
75th percentile. As a robustness test, two other proxy variables have been considered; the value-
added share of carbon-intensive industries (other non-metallic mineral, inland, water, and air
transport, electricity, mining), and value-added share of the electricity or energy (electricity
+mining) sector. Carbon-intensive sectors have been deﬁned as the sectors with carbon intensity
above the 75th percentile.
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Table 7.2. Regression results using R&D intensity over value added as innovation proxy: one-year lag for all independent variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Dependent Variable Log of R&D Intensity—Power Log of R&D Intensity—Energy
EPS Market Score 0.198+ 0.189+ 0.165 −0.006 −0.018
H1 (0.125) (0.121) (0.122) (0.111) (0.111)
EPS Non-market Score −0.089 −0.014 0.018 −0.058 −0.043
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.098) (0.098)
EPS Total Score 0.135 0.164 −0.079 0.006
(0.110) (0.162) (0.101) (0.148)
Govt. Effectiveness 0.964*** 0.769** 0.619** 0.666* 0.399 0.409 0.549+
H2 (0.323) (0.317) (0.312) (0.367) (0.294) (0.288) (0.338)
WGI 0.754 0.418
(0.538) (0.498)
Govt. Effectiveness*EPS
Interaction
−0.033 −0.098
(0.135) (0.123)
H3 Political orientation 0.222*** 0.211*** 0.202*** 0.200*** 0.199*** 0.112* 0.107* 0.111* 0.106*
(0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058)
VA Share Energy-
intensive industries
0.710** 0.827** 0.814** 0.815** 0.822** 0.537+ 0.525+ 0.542+ 0.553+
H4 (0.356) (0.356) (0.363) (0.356) (0.358) (0.342) (0.348) (0.341) (0.341)
Energy price index −3.053*** −3.203*** −3.193*** −3.202*** −8.309*** −8.629*** −8.286*** −8.388***
(0.756) (0.760) (0.753) (0.756) (3.034) (3.029) (3.012) (3.017)
Trade openness 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 −0.027*** −0.027*** −0.027*** −0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
R-squared 0.200 0.257 0.244 0.254 0.254 0.235 0.231 0.236 0.239
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
focuses on power and energy R&D intensity while Table 7.3 presents the
results for the power and environmental patent intensity speciﬁcations.
7.4.1 Role of Environmental Policy Stringency
Our results generally conﬁrm previous ﬁndings on the inducement effect of
environmental policies with respect to energy-related innovation activities.
We ﬁnd that the effect is weaker in the case of energy-related R&D and
stronger in the case of energy-related patents.
Focusing on the R&D speciﬁcation (Table 7.2), the coefﬁcient for EPS
variables is positive only if we consider investments in the power sector
alone (hence, electricity) and market-based policy instruments. Furthermore,
the coefﬁcient is only signiﬁcant at the 15 per cent level. Non-market-based
policies instead do not have any signiﬁcant effect on R&D, in line with Ulph
and Katsoulacos (1998) and Fischer, Parry, and Pizer (2003), who suggest that
stricter regulations fail to have any signiﬁcant effect on R&D.
Conversely, stronger results emerge when patent intensity (Table 7.3) is
used as the indicator for innovation. Both market and non-market-based
environmental policy stringency are positive and signiﬁcant for both types
of patents. The effect of market-based instruments is stronger in most speci-
ﬁcations and the inducement effect is larger when the broader deﬁnition based
on environmental patents is considered. Our results suggest that one unit
increase in the market-based score (corresponding approximately to one
interquartile range (IQR) change)14 increases power patents intensity by
between 1.3 and 1.4 per cent and environmental patent intensity by between
3 and 3.2 per cent. In the case of non-market-based policies, a similar change
increases power patents intensity by between 1.2 and 1.5 per cent,15 and
environmental patents intensity by 2.3 per cent. It should be noted that the
median improvement in policy stringency between 1995 and 2010 across the
20 countries has been approximately 1 unit for EPS market-based score and 2
units on a scale of 0–6 for EPS non-market-based score.16
These ﬁndings are in line with Johnstone, Ivan Haščič, and Popp (2010),
who show that increasing number of international climate policies have
resulted in an increase in renewable energy patents. These results are also in
14 In the case of EPS market score, moving from the 25th quartile (1.1) to the 75th quartile
(2.3) is equivalent to a one-unit increase in the EPS and is equivalent to moving from the policy
stringency of Belgium to that of Finland in 2010.
15 In the case of EPS non-market score, the IQR is larger than one. Moving from the 25th
quartile (1.1) to the 75th quartile (2.6) is equivalent to the increase in policy stringency observed
in Portugal between 1995 and 2010.
16 During 1995–2010, modest increases of 1 unit have been achieved in Italy, Australia,
Portugal, while more ambitious increases of 3–4 units have been achieved in South Korea and
The Netherlands, while Germany has achieved increase of about 2 units.
134 Institutions and Governance
Table 7.3. Regression results using patent intensity over value added as innovation proxy: two-year lag for all independent variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable Log of Patent intensity—Power Log of Patent intensity—Environment
H1 EPS Market Score 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.029**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016)
EPS Non-market Score 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.018+ 0.018+ 0.023**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.011) (0.110) (0.046)
EPS Total Score 0.017*** 0.004 −0.007 0.030** 0.020
(0.000) (0.587) (0.011) (0.277)
H2 Govt. Effectiveness 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.211*** 0.212*** 0.199*** 0.183***
(0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
WGI 0.095*** 0.313***
(0.000) (0.000)
Govt. Effectiveness*EPS
Interaction
0.015** 0.012
(0.010) (0.416)
H3 Political Orientation −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.006 −0.007 −0.007 −0.008 −0.007
(0.003) (0.395) (0.379) (0.330) (0.514) (0.006) (0.286) (0.314) (0.212) (0.256)
H4 VA Share Energy-
intensive industries
−0.003 −0.009 −0.009 −0.012 −0.012 −0.048 −0.061* −0.058+ −0.068* −0.069*
(0.014) (0.546) (0.557) (0.419) (0.380) (0.035) (0.089) (0.114) (0.061) (0.059)
Energy price index 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.027 0.058 0.032 0.053 0.056
(0.338) (0.544) (0.367) (0.309) (0.390) (0.640) (0.431) (0.413)
Trade Openness −0.000 −0.000+ −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001+ −0.001 −0.001
(0.170) (0.130) (0.175) (0.277) (0.180) (0.127) (0.189) (0.224)
Observations 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256
R-squared 0.662 0.666 0.651 0.657 0.663 0.634 0.638 0.623 0.630 0.630
Number of countries 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.15.
Source: Authors’ estimations.
line with ﬁndings from some of the previous literature including Lanjouw and
Mody (1996) and Popp (2002), namely that the number of environmental
patents tends to increase as the cost of pollution abatement rises. Finally, the
apparently stronger results in the case of the patent speciﬁcation than in the
R&D speciﬁcation are in line with the evidence presented by Rubashkina,
Galeotti, and Verdolini (2015), who focus on overall patenting within different
sectors of the economy. A reason for the stronger evidence of induced
innovation when using patents as opposed to R&D in the present work
might be due to the different ways patents and R&D are deﬁned. Patents
explicitly refer to clean and energy-saving innovations while the deﬁnition of
energy R&D does not specify the purpose of the expenditure. Overall, with
respect to Hypothesis 1, our regression results suggest that more stringent
environmental policies provide dynamic efﬁciency gains and incentives for
innovation in energy-saving and pollution-reducing technologies.
7.4.2 Role of Good Governance
Good governance appears to be an important driver of innovation. Depending
on the governance proxy used, a one-unit increase in government effectiveness
is associated with between 62 per cent and 96.4 per cent increase in power
R&D intensity (Table 7.2) and between 6.5 per cent and 31.3 per cent increase
in patent intensity (Table 7.3). This suggests that stronger economic institu-
tions promote innovation and are in line with the existing literature (Ayal and
Karras 1996; Habiyaremye and Raymond 2013; Tebaldi and Elmslie 2013;
Silve and Plekhanov 2015).
The marginal effect of governance might appear substantial given the coef-
ﬁcient interpretation provided in the paragraph above. However, a one-unit
increase in the governance proxy is a rather signiﬁcant change. It is comparable
to moving from the governance quality of a country such as Portugal (1.02) or
Slovenia (1.03) to that of countries such as Sweden or Finland (2.01 and 2.25) in
2010. Historically, the biggest improvements in governance quality have been
achieved by South Korea and Estonia, where the governance WGI score
increased by 0.6 and 0.5 between 1995 and 2010, respectively.
Overall, with respect to Hypothesis 2, our regression results suggest that
improvements in governance and government effectiveness provide incentives
for energy-related innovation.
7.4.3 Role of Political Orientation
Political orientation seems to be a more important factor for the input rather
than the output of innovation, as the variable has a statistically signiﬁcant
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effect only in the case of power and energy R&D intensity. A change in the
political orientation of the government from right towards a left-leaning
position, which corresponds to an IQR change in our sample, is associated
with an increase in industrial R&D of 11 per cent (power) and 22 per cent
(energy), respectively. To put these effects in perspective, countries such as
Portugal in our sample moved from a right-leaning orientation in 1995 to a
left-leaning government in 2010, while countries such as Canada, The Nether-
lands, and Sweden underwent the opposite change.
Overall, with respect to Hypothesis 3, left-leaning governments are more
likely to implement regulations that attract energy R&D investments, but this
does not translate into higher patent intensity.
7.4.4 Role of Resource Distribution, Market-Size
Effect, and Lobbying
The size of the energy sector, measured as the value-added share of energy-
intensive industries, has a positive impact on R&D intensity, suggesting that
either industries will allocate more resources towards R&D due to the larger
size of the potential market for energy innovations, or a larger energy sector
will be able to lobby for more resources to be allocated to energy R&D. A 1 per
cent increase in the value added share of energy intensive industries, approxi-
mately corresponding to an IQR change, increases power R&D intensity by
between 0.54 and 0.83 per cent. It should be noted that a 1 per cent increase is
a rather modest increase in this case. Between 1995 and 2010, changes in the
share of energy intensive industries in our sample varied between (−) 62 per cent
to (+) 28 per cent in France and Australia, respectively.
The smaller marginal effect on energy R&D intensity might reﬂect a
different relevance of political economy factors within the energy sector
itself.17 As explained by Hughes and Lipscy (2013), power markets tend to
be more concentrated within domestic markets whereas many oil and gas
companies are vertically integrated and international in scope. Therefore, the
political economy factors that matter for electricity are likely to differ from
those relevant for the oil and gas industry, which are included in our deﬁnition
of energy R&D. Factors such as lobbying are therefore more relevant for the
more inward-oriented sectors, such as power. Since the size of the energy
sector is a proxy of the lobbying power of energy-intensive industries, it has
the opposite effect on patent intensity, indicating that a larger energy sector
reduces the incentive to carry out energy-saving and clean innovation.
17 Including the mining sector (oil and gas extraction).
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Overall, with respect to Hypothesis 4, the larger the size of the potential
markets for energy innovation, the larger the inducement effect for industries
to invest in energy R&D. At the same time, larger energy sector has power to
lobby for more resources to be allocated to energy R&D. These effects seem to
prevail over coordination costs, however, market-size effects or lobbying from
the energy sector do not result in a larger number of cleaner patents. This
could mean that R&D investments are either used less effectively, or that they
are used to improve other aspects of the technologies, which are more
intangible and which are not codiﬁed in patents.
7.4.5 Role of Other Factors
We brieﬂy comment here on the coefﬁcients associated with our additional
control variables, namely the energy price index and trade openness. The
energy price index has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect on both
power and energy R&D intensities. A possible explanation in this respect is
that higher energy prices increase energy expenditure, both in the private and
public sectors, reducing resources available for other uses, including
R&D. Energy prices provide a positive incentive for patents, but the coefﬁ-
cients are not statistically signiﬁcant. Although the evidence is only impre-
cisely estimated, it suggests that even though fewer resources are allocated as
input to innovation, the innovation process is more efﬁcient at delivering new
inventions.
Trade openness has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on energy R&D
intensity, suggesting that countries with developed trade relationships have
fewer incentives to allocate resources to power and mining R&D and that
technology adoption and imitation displace domestic innovation. Note that the
effect is only signiﬁcant when the deﬁnition of energy R&D include the mining
sector, which is more outward-oriented than power, making the energy aggre-
gate sensitive to changes in trade exposure.18
7 .5 CONCLUSION
This chapter empirically investigates the impact of political economy and
institutional factors on the incentives to innovate in the energy sector. We
propose four empirical proxies that can measure energy-related innovation,
namely power R&D, energy R&D (consisting of the investment of the power
18 Refer to Dasgupta et al. (2016) for additional regressions and robustness tests.
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and mining sector), power patents (related to renewable and energy efﬁcient
technologies for power production), and environmental patents (including
energy patents as well as patents generally aimed at environmental protec-
tion). We focus on the empirical analysis of the role of four political economy
factors, namely environmental policy, good governance, political orientation,
and the distribution of resources to energy intensive industries that can induce
effects of both market-size and lobbying.
The analysis suggests that all abovementioned factors affect the incentives to
devote resources to energy R&D and to create new clean and energy efﬁcient
technologies. Speciﬁcally, market-based incentives, and to some extent also
non-market based incentives, results in dynamic efﬁciency gains. Countries
with better governance are characterized by higher levels of energy-related
R&D, while left-wing governments are more likely to devote R&D resources
to the energy sector but this does not translate into higher power-related patent
intensity. A larger distribution of resources towards energy-intensive sectors
can inducemarket-size effects and havemore power to lobby formore resources
to be allocated to energy R&D but this does not translate into higher patent
intensity.
The empirical analysis described in this chapter shows that political econ-
omy factors can act as barriers even in the presence of stringent environmental
policy. This implies that in order to favour changes towards a greener econ-
omy, countries should combine environmental policy with a general strength-
ening of institutional quality, consider the inﬂuence of government’s political
orientation on environmental policy, as well as the size of energy intensive
sectors in the economy, which affect both the lobbying structure and the
demand for energy innovations. These results point to the need to move the
literature on the determinants of energy-related innovation beyond the focus
on environmental policy instruments that has dominated the environmental
economics literature in recent years.
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